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The Fiscal Context 
The annual publication of the Government Expenditure and Revenues in Scotland Report (known as 
GERS), which is compiled by professional economists in the Scottish Government, is a highly political 
event. 
 
The stated aim of GERS is to enhance public understanding of fiscal issues in Scotland, by estimating a 
set of public sector accounts.  It does so by both estimating total government revenue and expenditure in 
Scotland, then calculating a net fiscal balance.  A fiscal deficit, however, is not a financial problem, as it is 
part of the UK public accounts and simply measures the gap between spending and revenues in Scotland 
(McCrone, 1999; Goudie, 2002). 
 
GERS was first published in 1992, and then developed and expanded in 1995, since when it has been 
published annually.  It was described as 
 
“an important element in the debate about Scotland’s future.   This debate has generated a range of 
claims  and  counterclaims  about  the  size  of  Scotland’s  Budget  deficit  or  fiscal  deficit,  and  the 
implications for Scottish living standards under constitutional options open to the people of Scotland”. 
(Scottish Office, 1995) 
 
It has always been subject to political spin by Scottish Ministers (Heald and McLeod, 2002), firstly to attack 
devolution, then independence, and now the SNP use the report to support their economic case for 
independence in the referendum process. 
 
Scottish Finance Minister John Swinney claimed “that Scotland continues to contribute more to the UK 
Treasury than we receive in public spending” (Scottish Government, 2012a).  This led to one respected 
economic analyst to describe this as “statistical massaging”, arguing that political leaders must not be 
allowed to tailor findings in government expenditure reports (Young, 2012). 
 
Arguments over GERS accuracy have generally been between the SNP and the other political parties, 
rather than between experts.  Whilst GERS is based on estimating techniques and the UK’s public 
expenditure statistics, researchers in the area have accepted that it maps out the broad magnitude of 
Scotland’s fiscal position (Heald et al, 1998; MacKay and Wood, 1999; Bell and Christie, 2002), and 
therefore “the kind of fiscal position from which an independent Scotland would start” (Murkens, Jones and 
Keating, 2002). 
 
Accounting for the Fiscal Deficit 
The long-term fiscal deficit has resulted from a long established system of incremental budgeting, with 
allocations to departments and devolved administrations based on political judgements of expenditure 
need, irrespective of fiscal contributions. In a unified system, fiscal transfers occur automatically, and nine 
of the twelve regions of the UK have allocations which exceed their tax contributions (Midwinter, 2004). 
 
What complicates the Scottish position is the treatment of North Sea revenues as ex regio (not attributed 
to any regions in the UK) in the public accounts.   In this paper, a geographical share of North Sea 
revenues is attributed to Scotland.  In a paper for the Scottish Parliament’s Finance Committee, I showed 
that from 1996 Scottish shares of all other taxes fell from being broadly equivalent to our population share, 
to less than it each year, averaging 8.3% of tax yields, and 8.6% of the population (Midwinter, 2007). The 
GERS report regularly publishes fiscal balances on this basis, and with oil revenues attributed to Scotland 
on the basis of an estimated geographical share, the most relevant measure for an independent Scotland. 
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Since its victory in the 2011 Scottish parliamentary election, the SNP Administration has been undertaking 
a public consultation exercise prior to its independence referendum, and published two papers favouring 
independence.  The first considers options for fiscal autonomy, and argues that: 
 
“The  current  framework  significantly  constrains  the  ability  of  the  Scottish  Government  to  boost 
Scotland’s long term competitiveness through, for example, introducing a simpler and more competitive 
regime.  It also constrains the ability to take short-term measures to stabilise the economy, through, for 
example, tax cuts or significant increases in public investment” 
(Scottish Government, 2009a). 
 
This is, however, wholly consistent with the reservation of macroeconomic responsibility with the central 
state  as  happens  in  most  countries,  and  the  devolution  of  microeconomic  functions  to  support  the 
economy.  It does not mean action is not taken. 
 
Similar arguments are set out in the consultation paper (Scottish Government, 2009b), identifying the 
creation of a “Sovereign Wealth Fund” based on Scotland’s oil and gas reserves, and cutting corporation 
tax to enhance growth, as desirable initiatives. 
 
The SNP has stated its view that “Scotland pays its way” (SNP 1997; 2001) for the past fifteen years, 
whilst acknowledging that surpluses in the 1980s were because of the high tax yields from oil and gas.  In 
public accounting, this also reflected the attribution of privatisation proceeds as revenues (Midwinter, 
2000). 
 
The consensus among researchers, however, is of a recurring structural deficit and high levels of public 
spending over the 20th Century (Lee, 1995; Woods, 2001; Bell and Christie, 2002; Goudie, 2002; 
Midwinter, 2007; and Calmans Independent Expert Group, 2008). 
 
By contrast, Hallwood and Macdonald (2006) who favour fiscal autonomy under devolution or 
independence, observe that “the Scottish budget deficit probably varies from negative to positive and back 
again”, although they offer no financial evidence that this is indeed the case, data readily available in the 
GERS series. 
 
So does the reported fiscal surplus stand up to scrutiny?  In fact, GERS 2010-11 shows that in only two 
years out of five did Scotland record a current budget surplus of £552m in 2006-7, and £999.3m in 2009. 
But this is not a measure of the fiscal position Scotland would inherit on independence, as it excludes 
capital expenditure, which is funded as capital from current expenditure within the Block Grant.  The actual 
net fiscal deficit, which the Finance Minister ignored, was £3 and £3.6 billions in these years. 
 
Deficits have increased significantly in recent years as UK revenues fell and borrowing grew in response to 
the world financial and economic crisis.   The net fiscal deficits reported in GERS 2010-11 are shown 
below. 
 
 
Table 1:               Scotland’s Net Fiscal Deficits, 2006-7 to 2010-11 
 
Year North Sea Revenue (£bn) Net Fiscal Deficit (£bn) 
2006-07 7504 3034 
2007-08 7115 3668 
2008-09 11740 3734 
2009-10 5930 14179 
2010-11 7951 10679 
 
 
Since 1992, GERS has reported fiscal deficits for Scotland, ranging from £2.9 billion to £14.2 billion, whilst 
North Sea revenues have ranged from £1 billion to £12 billion. 
 
Similar findings were reached in a recent note on Scotland’s fiscal position, applying a geographic share of 
North Sea revenues to Scotland (Ashcroft, 2012).  This shows that Scotland had a theoretical surplus in 
the 1980s, when both oil revenues and privatisation income levels were high.  Since 1990, there has been 
a recurring fiscal deficit, exacerbated since 2008 because of governmental responses to recession. 
Between 1990 and 2007 the deficit averaged above 3% of GDP, whilst the UK average was below this EU 
Stability Pact benchmark. 
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These figures highlight a major gap in the Scottish Government’s argument; namely its failure to 
acknowledge that its high level of dependency on a highly volatile oil and gas revenue will be a recurring 
budget problem.  Even when this yield is high, there would be no surplus to transfer on independence. 
 
This dependency on oil and gas revenues is clear from data reported in GERS which I collated in a paper 
for the Scottish Parliament’s Finance Committee.  Since 1993-4, the Scottish public finances have been in 
a recurring deficit position, even when the North Sea yield was above the £3.2 billion average (see Table 2 
below). 
 
Table 2: Oil and Gas Revenues and Net Fiscal Deficit in Scotland’s Public Finances 1993-2004 
 
Year Oil and Gas Revenues (£bn) Fiscal Deficit (£bn) 
1993 1.2 6.9 
1994 1.6 6.6 
1995 2.4 4.7 
1996 3.5 3.6 
1997 3.3 2.1 
1998 2.6 1.3 
1999 2.5 1.5 
2000 4.3 1.1 
2001 5.2 2.8 
2002 4.9 4.4 
2003 4.3 6.9 
2004 5.2 6.0 
Source: A. Midwinter (2007) Report prepared for The Scottish Parliament Finance Committee 
 
The lack of feasibility of implementing their promises to create an oil fund or to cut corporation tax should 
be clear from the GERS data.  Increased scrutiny of this in the news media has resulted in them being 
qualified by the Scottish Government as only happening when fiscal conditions permit, a key retreat from 
the claims in their earlier report (Scottish Government, 2009b).   This is a belated recognition of fiscal 
reality. 
 
Conclusion 
The claims by the Finance Minister that Scotland is in fiscal surplus within the UK cannot be validated from 
his government’s own data.  As a stream of researchers have observed, Scotland has been, and remains, 
in a net fiscal deficit position since GERS reports began. 
 
Moreover, this selective use of official data for partisan advantage is not new.  In opposition, the SNP 
regularly varied the assumptions underpinning the GERS estimates in their own calculations to deliver a 
paper surplus (Midwinter, 2002), so this practice has been continued in government. 
 
Similarly, the Scottish Government claims Scotland has been “underperforming” in relative economic 
growth, based wholly on a single indicator, GDP (Scottish Government, 2010).   The Centre for Public 
Policy and the Regions has argued that GDP per capita is a better measure of changes in living standards 
(McLaren, 2012), and that Scottish growth has been broadly in line with the UK, and above the OECD 
average, since devolution.  Indeed, the Scottish Government’s own data records improved growth rates 
from 1.8% to 2.3%, but this is ignored.   So, there has been no economic underperformance in recent 
years, nor would there be any fiscal surplus available on independence. 
 
It should also be clear that the fiscal deficit is not a problem within the UK, as it simply reflects the fiscal 
flows within a unified fiscal system, which recognises higher needs in nine of the twelve nations and 
regions of the UK.  The Finance Minister has presented a false prospectus in his assessment of the fiscal 
implications of independence. 
 
The Scottish Government’s assessment of the fiscal implications of independence contains fundamental 
errors of fact and judgement, and its claims must be subject to continuing rigorous scrutiny in the 
referendum process.  The structural deficit remains a fundamental problem it is unwilling to address. 
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